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In Reply to the Respondent's Brief, the Appellant 
submits the following: 
1. Despite the very clear language of the Appeals 
Court, denying the only grounds asserted by the Respondent (that 
there had been an implicit repeal of the 49-10-28 UCA Retirement 
Act, by passage of 49-9a-4 UCA,), and the correct finding that 
"Thus, in 1983 the Legislature, by clear express language 
provided that two disability retirement systems could co-exist 
in Utah.", ). (Appeals Court Opinion, P3), Respondent insists 
on confusing the two systems. 
2. The two systems had different definitions of what 
constituted "disability". The Appeals Court Opinion shows the 
same confusion, (see footnote, bottom of P. 3) 
"1. Ellis concedes he is not "totally disabled" as 
defined by the Disability Act and, therefore, does not 
qualify for disability benefits under this statutory 
scheme." 
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Appellant concedes that he does not meet the definition 
of disability under the 1983 disability insurance program, since 
it requires him to be unable to "perform any renumerative 
employment"; Appellant does not concede that he fails to meet 
the definition of disability under the 1967 act, "incapacity of 
a member to perform the usual duties of his employment". 
3. It is Appellant's position that nothing in the 1983 
act requires him to meet the 1983 definition in order to qualify 
for retirement under the 1967 Act, and that he can qualify for 
retirement under 49-10-28 at any time prior to it's repeal in 
1987. Appellant applied for retirement in April, 1986, 
effective July 1, 1986. At that time the provisions of the 1967 
Act were still in effect, and Appellant met all prerequisits of 
the 1967 act, necessary to retire under that act. As a matter 
of fact, the Board admits that Appellant will be retired under 
the parent Retirement Act (not under 49-9a ) when he reaches age 
60, because he opted out of the retirement system January 1, 
1985, and froze his 20 years of service under 49-10-14 UCA., the 
only issue here, is whether he qualified for early medical 
retirement. 
4. Counsel has argued that because Appellant opted out 
of the Retirement Act under 49-10-14 UCA (he was a department 
head without Civil Service Tenure) that somehow this deprives 
him of his right to early medical retirement. This is a 
smokescreen argument, having nothing to do with the issues. The 
Appellant froze his 20 years of vested retirement service 
effective January 1, 1985, but did not withdraw his 
contributions, or relinquish his rights to draw benefits when he 
reaches 60 years of age. 
5. Counsel persists in arguing that the 1983 Act was a 
new program. That simply is not true. Section 49-10-28.5 UCA 
(1967) was an almost identical, optional Salary insurance. It, 
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like the 1983 Disability Act was not a 'vested right1 portion of 
the Retirement Act. It was just a supplemental insurance 
program. There is no comparison between either insurance 
program described in 49-10-28.5 UCA, or the new 49-9a-4, 8, and 
the vested right program described in 49-10-28 UCA. The two 
insurance programs are more akin to Workmen's Compensation 
benefits than they are to the Retirement Act, which probably 
explains why they required "Total Disability" in terms of 
"inability to perform any renumerative employment". By 
contrast, 49-10-28 UCA, being part and parcel of the Retirement 
Act, is a fully contributed investment program, under which the 
participants were manditorily required to participate, they made 
contributions, their employer made contributions, and the Board 
was to invest those contributions and use the proceeds of 
investment to pay the benefits provided for those who by reason 
of illness or injury, were no longer able to do their former 
jobs. 
That is why the Appellant has a Constitutional right to 
demand that he be retired, medically, under 49-10-28 UCA, which 
was still in full force and effect, fully funded, and available, 
up until the Legislature repealed it effective July 1, 1987. 
6. The key word, necessary to an accurate 
interpretation of Legislative intent as to the meaning of 
49-9a-8 UCA (1983) is "covered". It is obvious that the 
Legislature intended 49-9a-8 to cover total disabilities * as 
defined in that chapter (49-9a) after the effective date of the 
legislation; by negative implication, if the disability was not 
"covered" by the new act, it had no effect, and since 
Appellant's disability was not covered by the new act, he still 
has recourse under the old act. 
Respectfully submitted, this 16th day of December, 1988. 
NOTICE OF MAILING 
Mailed 10 copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Appellant, to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, State Capitol 
Building, SLC, Utah 84134; four copies being mailed to Mark A, 
Madsen, attorney for the Respondent, 540 East Second South, SLC, 
Utah 84102, postage prepaid this 2<f) day of December, 1988. 
